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CAUTIOUS SKEPTICISM ABOUT THE BENEFIT OF
ADDING MORE FORMALITIES TO THE MANUAL FOR
COURTS-MARTIAL RULE-MAKING PROCESS:
A RESPONSE TO CAPTAIN KEVIN J. BARRY
Captain Gregory E. Maggs*
Opinions and conclusions in articles published in the Military Law
Review are solely those of the authors. They do not necessarily
reflect the views of the Judge Advocate General, the Department of
the Army, or any other government agency.
I. Introduction
In Modernizing the Manual for Courts-Martial Rule-Making Process:
A Work in Progress,1 Captain Kevin J. Barry, U.S. Coast Guard (Retired),
describes the great and steady progress that has occurred in the *2 methods
for adopting changes to the Manual for Courts-Martial (MCM).2 As his
article demonstrates, 3 the amendment process has become much more open

*

Judge Advocate General’s Corps, United States Army Reserve, and Professor
of Law, George Washington University. Captain Maggs has served as an individual
mob ilization augm entee (IM A) assigned to the O ffice of T he Judge Adv ocate
General (OT JAG), Criminal Law Division (CLD) since 1996. In this capacity, he
has provided suppo rt to officers assigned to the Joint Se rvice C omm ittee and its
W orking Group, which has helped develop his interest in the Manual for
Courts-Martial, including its rule-making process. While performing a recent active
duty for training in the C LD , CPT M aggs had the opp ortunity to begin an article
expressing his views and opinions about another author’s proposed am endments to
the Manual for Courts-Martial rule-making process (see footnote 2). While writing
this article, CPT Maggs received extremely helpful suggestions and assistance from
Colonel Charles E. Trant, Colonel Mark W . Harvey, Lieutenant Colonel Denise
Lind, and L ieutenant Colonel Lisa Schenck. For their help and assistance, CPT
Maggs is most grateful. CPT M aggs acknowledges that the opinions and conclusions contained in this article are his, and do not necessarily reflect the views of the
Arm y, The Jud ge Advo cate G enera l, or any government agency.
1
Kevin J. B arry, Mo dernizing the M anual for Courts-Martial Rule-Making
Process: A Work in Prog ress, 165 MIL. L. R EV . 237 (2000).
2
See MAN UAL FOR CO URTS-MAR TIAL, UNITED STA TES (1998)
[hereinafter M CM ].
3
See Barry, supra note 2 , at 241 -64.
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and responsive to outside views than in decades past. Significant improvements noted by Captain Barry include the following:
• Since 1982, the Department of Defense (DOD) has had a policy of
publishing notice of amendments to the MCM in the Federal Register
and waiting seventy-five days for public comment before submitting
them to the President for promulgation by executive order.4
• Also since 1982, the notice printed in the Federal Register has
included not only a summary of proposed amendments, but also
information about where and how to obtain their full text.5
• Since 1993, the Federal Register has included the full text of
non-binding commentary to be published with new MCM provisions
in the familiar “Discussion” and “Analysis” sections.6
• Also since 1993, the Joint Service Committee on Military Justice
(JSC), which has responsibility for preparing MCM rule changes for
the President’s issuance, has held public meetings for the purpose of
receiving comments during the seventy-five day waiting period.7
• Since 1994, the JSC has published full-text notice of proposed
changes to the MCM and new commentary prior to the public
meeting and prior to their approval as amendments to be submitted
to the President.8
• Since 1996, a DOD Directive has obliged the JSC to “consider all views
presented at the public meeting and written comments*3 submitted
during the seventy-five day period in determining the final form of any
proposed amendments.”9
• Starting in 2000, the JSC will send annual calls for proposals to the
judiciary, trial, and defense organizations, the Judge Advocate General

4

See id. at 249 (citing Department of Defense Policy Notice, 47 Fed. Reg. 3401
(Jan. 2 5, 19 82)).
5
See, e.g., 47 F ed. R eg. 15 ,823 (Apr. 13, 1 982 ).
6
See Barry, supra note 2 , at 252 .
7
See id.
8
See id. at 252-53 .
9
Id. at 259 (quoting DOD DIRECTIVE 5500.17, RO LE AN D RE SPO NSIB ILITIES OF THE JOINT SERVICE COMMITTEE ON MILITARY JUSTICE (JSC)
at encl. 2, E2.4.6 (May 8, 1996) (internal quotation marks omitted) [hereinafter
DO D D IRE CT IVE 550 0.17 ]).
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schools, and elsewhere. It also will publish an invitation in the Federal
Register for the public to submit proposals.10
Although Captain Barry acknowledges the significance of the changes
in the JSC process over the years, he believes that much room for progress
still remains. He suggests that the recent high profile sexual misconduct
cases relating to Lieutenant Kelly Flinn,11 the drill sergeants at Aberdeen
Proving Ground,12 Sergeant Major of the Army Gene C. McKinney, 13 and

10

See id. at 262.
On 28 January 1997 , charges of disob edience o f a “no contact” o rder, false
statements, fraternization, and ad ultery were pre ferred against L ieutenant Flinn. The
Assistant Secretary of the Air Force approved her resignation in lieu of trial with a
characterization of general und er honorable con ditions. See Tony Capaccio, Pilot
Errors, AM. JOURN ALISM REV ., Oct., 1997, at 18 (summa rizing the entire Kelly
Flinn incident).
12
From November 1996 to Ap ril 199 8, forty-nine male cadre membe rs and drill
sergeants were investigated for sexual misconduct at Aberdeen P roving Ground
(APG ). Five APG drill sergeants and a training unit company commander were tried
by court-martial. O ne form er AP G d rill sergeant was found not guilty for
misconduct while an APG drill sergeant. Captain Derrick Robertson was sentenced
to confinement for three years, total forfeiture of a ll pay and allowances, and
dismissal from the service. His pretrial agreement limited confinement to twelve
months with eight m onths su spended . Staff Sergeant Delm ar Sim pson was
sentenced to confinement for twenty-five years, total forfeiture s, reduction to
Priva te E-1, and a dishonorable discharge. Staff Sergeant Vernell Robinson Jr. was
sentenced to confinement for six months, total forfeitures, and a disho norable
discharge. Staff Sergeant Wayne Gamble was sentenced to confinement for ten
months, total forfeitures, reduction to E1 , and a dishonorable discharge. Staff
Sergeant Herman Gu nter was sentenced to reduction from staff sergeant to
specialist, and a reprimand. Staff Sergeant Marvin C . Kelley was sentenced to
reduction from staff sergeant to private E-1, to be confined for ten months, and to
be discharged from the service with a disho norable discharge. See To m Curley &
Steven Komarow, For Army, the Focus Now Turns to Remaining Cases, USA
TO DA Y, A pr. 19 97 (summ arizing charges and verdicts).
13
On 16 March 1999, Command Sergeant M ajor Gene C. McKinney, the former
Sergeant Majo r of the Army was convicted, contrary to his pleas, by a court
composed of officer and enlisted members of one specification of obstruction of
justice in v io latio n o f U CM J Article 134. He was sentenced to reduction to Master
Sergeant. He was acquitted of four specifications of maltreatment of subordinates,
one specification of simple assault, four spec ifications o f wrong ful solicitation to
com mit adultery, one specification of adultery, one specification of obstruction of
justice, two specifications of communication of a threat, four specifications of
indecent assault, and one specification of assault on a superior commissioned
officer. The findings and sentence were approved by the general court-martial
11

4
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Major General David Hale14 have “raised questions about whether the
military trial process is fair.”15 Captain Barry believes that one “crucially
important issue”16 that “bears decidedly on ... perceptions of fairness” of
the military justice system, 17 but which has “received considerably less
attention” than other issues,18 is “the method by which *4 amendments to
the Manual for Court-Martial ... are proposed, considered, and adopted.”19

convening authority on 28 Au gust 19 98. See M cK inne y v. Ivany, 4 8 M .J. 908
(Army C t. Crim. App . 1998 ) (providing these and other details); ABC News, Inc.
v. Po well, 47 M.J. 363 (1997 ) (same).
14
On 17 March 1998, M ajor General D avid R .E. Hale was found guilty in
accordance with his pleas of seven specifications of conduct unbecoming an officer
and one specification of making a false official statem ent. M ajor General H ale had
improper relationships with the spouses of four subordinates and then lied about it
to his superiors. Major General Hale was sentenced by a military judge to receive
a reprimand, forfeiture of $1500 pay per month for twelve months and a $10,000
fine. In accordance with the terms of a pretrial agreement, the general court-martial
convening authority reduced the forfeitures to $1000 pay per m onth for twelve
months, and approved the remainder of the adjudged sentence. See Harry G.
Summ ers, Defining Deviancy Down in the Army, WASH. TIMESS, Mar. 23, 1999,
at A19. He was subsequently retired at the direction of the Secretary of the Army
in the grad e of B rigadier Genera l. See Army Secretary Takes Back Star from
Retired Genera l; Demoted Officer Convicted of Affairs with Wives of Four
Subordinates, BA LT . SUN, Sept. 3, 199 9, at 4A .
15
Barry, supra note 2 , at 239 .
16
Id. at 240.
17
Id.
18
Id.
19
Id. Captain Barry’s assertion that the process for amending the MCM has
received little public attention appears correct. The Office of The Judge Ad vocate
General (OT JAG), Criminal Law Division (CLD), is responsible for answering
most questions from the public about the Army cases in the military justice system
that are directed to the President, Congress, Secretary of the Arm y, Chief o f Staff
of the Army, and The Judge Advocate General. Colonel Mark Harvey, Deputy
Chief, OT JAG -CLD , indicated that approxim ately 1500 letters were received from
the public from 1996-2000 . Aside from correspondence from the Standing
Committee on Armed Forc es Law , the National Institute of Military Justice, and
lawyers affiliated with these organizations, no correspondence reque sting more
pub lic participation in the JSC was received. Out of hundreds of newspaper articles
relating to the Aberdeen P roving G round cases, and the courts-martial of Sergeant
Major of the Army Gene C. McKinney and Major General David R.E . Hale, none
expressed conc ern ab out the JSC process. Interview with Colonel M ark W . Harvey,
Deputy Chief, Office of the Staff Judge Advocate, Criminal Law D ivision, in
Arlington, V a. (21 July 20 00) [hereinafter H arvey Interview].
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Accordingly, in Part IV of his article,20 Captain Barry advances various
“Recommendations for the Future”21 for improving*5 the method of
creating and amending the procedural and evidentiary rules for courts-martial.
Although Captain Barry does not enumerate them, he puts forth a total
of seven specific proposals. Three recommendations are based on a
resolution of the American Bar Association (ABA) House of Delegates.22
In 1997, at the recommendation of the ABA’s Standing Committee on
Armed Forces Law (SCAFL), the ABA House of Delegates approved the
following resolution:
RESOLVED, That the American Bar Association recommends that
federal law be amended to model court-martial rule-making procedures on
those procedures used in proposing and amending other Federal court rules
of practice, procedure, and evidence by establishing: ( 1 ) a b r o a d l y
constituted advisory committee, including public membership and
including representatives of the bar, the judiciary, and legal scholars, to
consider and recommend rules of procedure and evidence at courts-martial;
(2) a method of adopting rules of procedure and evidence at courts-martial which is generally consistent with court rule-making procedure in
Federal civilian courts; (3) requirements for reporting to Congress [and]
a waiting period for rules of procedure and evidence at courts-martial.23
The fourth proposal is derived from a 1973 law review article by Major
General Kenneth Hodson.24 In the article, General Hodson urged that “a
Military Judicial Conference, headed by the Chief Judge of the Court of
Military Appeals, be established and given power to prescribe rules of
procedure and evidence.”25 As described more fully below, 26 this proposal
relates closely to the ABA’s second recommendation because the *6
Judicial Conference headed by the Supreme Court leads the court
rule-making procedure in civilian courts.

20

See Barry, supra note 2 , at 264 -76.
Id. at 264.
22
See id. at 264-69 .
23
American Bar Association, Summary of Action of the Ho use of De legates,
1997 Midyear Meeting, San Antonio, Texas 2 (1997) [hereinafter ABA Summary].
24
See Kenneth J. Hodson, Military Justice: Abo lish or Change, 22 KAN. L.
RE V. 31 (1973 ).
25
Id. at 53.
26
See infra Part III.D.
21
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The final three recommendations for the future come from Captain
Barry himself. First, Captain Barry urges creating an enforceable “mechanism to make available to the public the contents and justifications for ...
proposals ... generated within the DOD.”27 Second, Captain Barry
recommends making available to the public “the minutes of the meetings
of JSC (and of its working group) and the decisions on proposals generated
within the JSC and the DOD.”28 Third, Captain Barry advocates expanding
the membership of the JSC beyond “the five officers chiefly responsible for
the administration of military justice in the five services.” 29
When Captain Barry addresses the subject of military justice, his
thoughts warrant attention and reflection because of his long and distinguished experience in the field. During his twenty-five years on active duty
in the Coast Guard, Captain Barry served in a variety of important
positions, including Chief Trial Judge, appellate military judge, and chief
of the Coast Guard’s Legislative Division.30 Since retiring from active
service, Captain Barry has developed an extensive private practice in
military and veterans law. He also has played key roles in leading military
law professional organizations, including the National Institute of Military
Justice, the Judge Advocates Association, and the ABA’s SCAFL.31 The
SCAFL’s views are similarly influential because of the vast military and
legal experience of its membership, including dozens of retired judge
advocates, some of whom are retired general officers. The specific
endorsement of most of the proposals by the ABA and by the legendary
Major General Hodson, needless to say, makes Captain Barry’s ideas even
more worthy of study.
This article addresses Captain Barry’s proposals. Part II, begins by
discussing three preliminary considerations concerning the MCM rule-making procedure.32 First, recent history suggests that the MCM probably will
undergo only incremental changes for the foreseeable future. Second, the
process of amending the MCM is largely irrelevant to most of the major
military justice reforms now being urged. Third, changes to the MCM *7
rule-making process would affect the present balance of powers between
Congress and the President, possibly producing unintended adverse
consequences.
27

Barry, supra note 2 , at 275 .
Id.
29
Id.
30
See id. at 237 n.1.
31
See id.
32
See infra Part II.
28

CAUTIOUS SKEPTICISM ABOUT FORMALITIES

7

Part III then responds to each of Captain Barry’s seven recommendations. 33 On the whole, none of the proposals is radical or dangerous.
Indeed, each is closely analogous to the federal civilian criminal justice
system. In addition, no insurmountable legal obstacles would prevent their
adoption. Yet, closer inspection suggests that, in light of all the progress
that already has occurred in the methods for amending the MCM, none of
the proposals would yield significant new benefits. At the same time, all
but one or two of the proposals would impose at least some significant
burdens or costs. For these reasons, at least at present, the JSC, the DOD,
the President, and Congress should view Captain Barry’s recommendations
with cautious skepticism.34
II. Preliminary Considerations
Before assessing the desirability of adding new procedures and
formalities to the MCM rule-making process, three preliminary considerations require attention: (1) the nature of future amendments to the MCM
or, put another way, what the MCM rule-making process likely will be used
for; (2) the kinds of reforms now being sought for the military justice
system; and (3) the effect changes to the MCM rule-making process might
have on the balance of powers between the President and Congress. The
following discussion addresses these three considerations.
A. Changes to the MCM that Will Occur in the Future
What kind of changes to the MCM will occur in the future? The nature
of the changes certainly matters a great deal to the process. If only
adjustments to individual rules of evidence and procedure are likely to
happen, rather than sweeping systemic changes, then the need for an
extensive revision of the MCM rule-making process seems less important.
The *8 final results probably will not vary much no matter how amendments are processed before the President approves them.
The MCM, to be sure, has seen dramatic changes in the past fifty years.
In 1951, the President promulgated a new version of the MCM,35 designed

33

See infra Part III.
See infra Part IV.
35
See MAN UA L FO R COU RT S-M ARTIAL, U NIT ED ST AT ES (1951); see
also COLONEL CHARLES L. DECKER, DEP’T OF ARMY, LEGAL AND
LEGISLATIVE BASIS, MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL UNITED STATES
1951, The Army Library, Washington D.C. (195 1) (discussing the history,
preparation, and processing of the 1951 MCM ).
34
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to conform to the newly enacted UCMJ.36 The President approved a
significantly revised version of the MCM in 1969,37 taking into account the
extensive changes in military law wrought by the Military Justice Act of
1968.38 In 1980, the President codified the Military Rules of Evidence,39
largely following the codification of the civilian Federal Rules of Evidence
in 1975. 40 The last major revision occurred in 1984. In that year, the
President adopted the codified Rules for Courts-Martial (R.C.M.),41 and
made substantial changes to address revisions in the UCMJ caused by the

36

Congress enacted the UC MJ on 5 May 1950, b ut delayed its effective date
until 31 May 1951. See Act of May 5, 1950, 64 Stat. 108 (codified as amended at
10 U.S.C. §§ 801-946); see also INDEX AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
UNIFORM CODE O F M ILITAR Y JU STIC E (1950 ) (setting forth the extensive
legislative history, hearings, reports, and floor debates prior to passage of the
Uniform C ode of M ilitary Justice).
37
See MAN UA L FO R COU RT S-M ARTIAL, U NIT ED ST AT ES (1969); see
also U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, PAM. 27-2, ANALYSIS OF CONTENTS OF
MANUAL FOR COU RTS-MART IAL, UNITED STAT ES 1969, REVISED
EDITION (July 1970) (containing a paragraph by paragraph analysis of the changes
made in the 1969 MCM ).
38
See Military Justice Act of 1968, 82 Stat. 1334 (1968). T his act, which
became effective in 196 9, among o ther things established the present role of the
military judge in courts-martial. See John S. Co oke, Military Justice and the
Uniform Code of Military Justice, ARMY LAW ., Mar. 2000, at 3 (disc ussing this
history).
39
See STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG ET AL., MILITARY RULES OF
EV IDE NC E M AN UA L (3d ed. 1991 ).
40
See STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG ET AL., FEDERAL R ULE S OF E VIDE NC E M AN UA L 4 (7 th ed. 1 998 ).
41
Exec. Order N o. 12,473, 49 F ed. Reg. 17,152 (A pr. 23, 1984); Exec. Order
No . 12,4 84, 4 9 Fed. Re g. 28,825 (July 13 , 198 4).
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Military Justice Act of 1983.42 These major revisions undoubtedly had a
dramatic effect on the substance and practice of military law.
The nature of MCM amendments, however, has changed since 1984.
The President has amended the MCM regularly, but as military jurisprudence has become more similar to civilian criminal procedure (except in *9
the area of sentencing), sweeping revisions appear to have become
something of the past. Most of the recent amendments to the MCM have
strived to serve one of three limited purposes. These amendments either
correct errors or oversights in existing rules, conform the rules of procedure
and evidence to legislative changes to the UCMJ, or bring military law into
alignment with civilian criminal law. They have not attempted bold reforms
that effect the overall structure of the MCM.

42

See Military Justice Act of 1983, Pub . L. No . 98-2 09, 9 7 Stat. 1393 (19 83);
John S. Co oke, Hig hligh ts of the Military Justice Act of 1983, ARMY LAW ., Feb.
1984, at 4. The Military Justice Act of 198 3 directed the Secretary of Defense to
establish a commission to study and make recomm endations to Congress regarding
the following issue s:
1. Whether the sentencing authority in court-martial cases should be exercised
by a military judge in all non-capital cases to which a military judge has been
detailed;
2. W hether military judges and the Courts of Military Review should have the
pow er to suspend sentences;
3. W hether the jurisdiction of the special court-martial should be expanded to
perm it adjudgment of sentences including confinement of up to one year, and wha t,
if any, chan ges sho uld be made to current app ellate jurisdiction ;
4. W hether military jud ges, including tho se pre siding at special and general
courts-martial and those sitting on the Courts of Military Review, should have
tenure;
5. W hat should be the elements of a fair and equitable retirement system for the
judges of the United States Co urt of M ilitary Appeals.
The resulting Military Justice Act of 1983 Advisory Commission was composed
of six military and three civilian members. Over a one-year period, the Commission
heard testimony from twenty-seven witnesses, including civilian experts, and
received public com ment from so urces including retired military lead ers, public
interest groups, bar associations and experts in military justice and criminal law.
The Commission’s charter and notice of hearings was published in the Federal
Register. See THE MILITARY JUSTICE ACT OF 1983 ADVISORY C OM MISSIO N R EP OR T (1 984 ) [hereinafter 1983 REPO RT ].
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The 1999 amendments to the MCM provide good illustrations of the
incremental character of recent changes. 43 The first section of the President’s executive orders alters six procedural rules. These alterations correct
oversights and vestiges from past laws. For example, the first change
deletes the words “active duty” from the qualifications for military judges
in R.C.M. 507(c).44 This revision allows Reserve Component judges to
conduct trials during inactive duty training and travel.45 The revisions also
*10 bring military law into accordance with recent developments in civilian
criminal procedure. For instance, the amendments create special rules for
testimony by children in child abuse and domestic violence cases,46 and
recognize a psychotherapist-patient privilege.47 Additional changes make
adjustments to existing rules. For instance, the changes expand the
evidence admissible at sentencing, identify a new aggravating factor in
capital cases, and define an offense of reckless endangerment under UCMJ
Article 134.48 Other recent proposals have similarly limited scopes.49
The near future probably holds more of the same. The military justice
system has matured during the fifty years since passage of the UCMJ.50
The number of courts-martial held annually has declined dramatically. 51
43

See Exec. Order N o. 13 ,140 , 64 F ed. R eg. 55 ,115 (Oct. 6, 1999).
Id.
45
See Martin Sitler, Explanation of the 1999 Am end ments to the Manual for
Courts-Martial, ARMY LAW ., Nov. 1999, at 27.
46
See id. at 28.
47
See id. at 29.
48
See id.
49
Changes proposed by the JSC in 1998 and 2000 will conform the MCM to
legislative amendments to the U CM J concerning Article 56 a (Sentence to
Confinement Without Eligibility for Parole) and Article 19 (Jurisdiction of Special
Courts-Martial). See 65 Fed. Reg. 39,883 (June 28, 2000); 63 Fed. Reg. 25,835
(M ay 11, 199 8).
50
The military appe llate courts and Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces have
authored more than 100 volumes o ver the last fifty years of military justice caselaw,
providing a significant body of law filling in the details and providing a judicial
explanation for the UCM J and MCM .
51
During the p ast three years alo ne, the total number of general and special
courts-martial in the Army, Navy, Air Forc e, and Coast Guard have fallen from
5259 to 43 97, fo r a total decrease of 16% Com pare Annual Reports on M ilitary
Justice for the Period October 1, 1998 to September 30, 1999 secs. 3-6, ava ilable
at http://www .armfo r.uscourts.gov/annual/FY97/FY97Rept.htm (last visited 4 Aug.
2000) (same ). The long-term decrea sing trend is even m ore d rama tic in the Army.
See Lawrence J. M orris, Our Mission, No Future: The Case for Closing the United
States Army Disciplinary Barracks, 6 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 77, 88 (1996)
44
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Most importantly, the MCM now has a modern, codified structure likely to
endure for the long term. Consequently, most new changes to the MCM are
likely to correct problems affecting a few cases, or to adapt the rules of
evidence and procedure so that they conform to incremental amendments
to the UCMJ by Congress or developments occurring outside the armed
forces.
In the military, leaders always must look forward and must avoid the
mistake-as the quip goes-of preparing to fight the last war, instead of the
next. Accordingly, in assessing the procedures for amending the MCM, the
question should not be whether the current procedures could have handled
massive revisions of the kinds seen in 1951, 1969, 1980, or 1984.52 *11
Rather, the question is whether the current procedures-which are now far
more open-will satisfy the needs of the present and future, during which
times the MCM likely will face annual revisions that add or adjust only a
few rules at a time.
B. Limitations of Changes to the Rule-Making Process
Captain Barry and other proponents of reforming the MCM rule-making
process surely do not view changing the process as an end in itself. On the
contrary, they presumably see their reform proposals as the means to an
end. They must believe that a better rule-making process will facilitate
adoption of better rules, producing an improved military justice system.

(noting that the number of general and special courts-martial in the Army has fallen
from 680 3 in 19 80 to 117 8 in 19 95).
52
This article does not suggest that the MCM rule-making procedures were
necessarily inadequate in the past. Historically, major changes to the MCM
generally have occurred in response to amendments to the UCM J by Congress. In
this context, greater public participation in the MCM rule-ma king process would
have provided the President only limited benefits. The President had little discretion
in conforming the MCM to the UC MJ revisions. Congress, moreover, typically has
received significant p ublic inp ut befo re amending the U CM J. As C aptain Barry
carefully describes, “[i]n the early years of the UCMJ, there was significant civilian
interest in the military justice system, and there was notable input by civilian groups
into the legislative process affecting statutory changes to military justice. However,
there seems to be no evidence of a similar interest or participation in the rule-making process.” Barry, supra note 2, at 244. It also bears noting that the President and
the DOD have never shut out the public; although organiza tions and individuals
with an interest in the military justice process sometimes have not availed
themselves of the opp ortunity, they have always been free to communicate with the
President and m ilitary officials regarding military justice matters.
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Accordingly, in assessing the need for reforming the MCM rule-making
procedures, two questions arise: (1) What kinds of changes to the military
justice system do reformers want to make?; and (2) Will altering the MCM
rule-making procedures bring about those changes?
For decades, commentators repeatedly have raised a familiar set of
concerns about the military justice system. Presumably, many of the
advocates who want to reform the MCM rule-making process hope that new
procedures will overcome long-standing Department of Defense resistance
to changing the system to address these concerns. They also may expect a
new process to help them deal with other serious problems in the future.
For example, one recurring criticism of the military justice system,
articulated mostly by attorneys rather than the general public, concerns the
*12 independence of the military judiciary. Under the UCMJ and MCM,
trial and appellate judges have no tenure of office.53 In theory, if these
judges render unpopular decisions, the Judge Advocate General for the
service concerned could reassign them to non-judicial duties.54 Although
tenure of office does not necessarily immunize judges from outside
pressure (as elected and appointed civilian judges have experienced), some
commentators have argued that giving military judges fixed terms would
make them more independent.55 To date, however, neither Congress nor the
Supreme Court has required the services to give their judges tenure of
office.56

53

See Fredric I. Led erer & Barbara S. H undley, Needed: An Independent
Military Judiciary-A Proposal to Amend the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 2
W M . & MAR Y BILL RTS. J. 629, 629-30 (1994). The civilian judges of the Court
of Appeals for the Armed Forces serve for terms of fifteen years. See 10 U .S.C. §
142(b) (2000). In 1999, the Secretary of the Army approved limited tenure for
Army judges. See U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, REG. 27-10, MILITARY JUSTICE,
paras. 8-1 g and 13-12 (1999) (providing tenure for Army trial and appellate judges
for a minimum of three years with limited excep tions).
54
See Lederer & Hun dley, supra note 5 4, at 62 9-30 .
55
See Hod son, supra note 25, at 53; L ederer & Hun dley, supra note 54, at
668-73; Michael I. Spak & Jonathon P . To mes, Courts-M artial: Time to Play Taps,
28 SW . U. L. REV. 481, 531-33 (1999); Andrew M. Ferris, Comment, Military
Justice: Removing the Pro bab ility of Unfairness, 63 U. CIN. L. REV. 439, 488-92;
Karen A. Ruzic, Note, Military Justice and the Supreme Court’s Outdated
Stand ard of Deference: Weiss v. United States, 70 CHI.-KENT. L. REV.. 265,
284 -89 (1 994 ).
56
At the request of Co ngress, the M ilitary Justice Act of 1983 Advisory
Commission considered this issue and recom mended against p rovid ing tenure to
military trial and appellate jud ges. See 198 3 REP OR T, supra note 43, at 8-9. In
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*13 A second recurring criticism deals with the selection of court
members. At present, the convening authority selects the members eligible
to serve on courts-martial.57 Although judicial decisions forbid commanders from using the power of selection to pack the court for the purpose of
obtaining a specific result, 58 a commander with a lack of integrity
potentially could skew choices in favor of the prosecution. Some reformers
would like to see panel members selected randomly, much like juror
venires in civilian criminal cases, in order to remove any temptation a
convening authority might have to pervert the military justice system. 59
Congress and the JSC recently have been studying this issue.60

Weiss v. United States, 510 U.S. 163, 181 (1994), the Supreme Court held that the
accused failed to demonstrate that the factors favoring a fixed term of office
“overcome the balance struck by Congress.” The court gave the following three
reaso ns for its decision :
(1) [A]lthough a fixed term of office is a traditional component of the
Anglo-American civilian judicial system, a fixed term of office has never
been a part of the military justice tradition, given that courts-martial have
been conducted in the United States for more than 200 years without the
presence of a tenured judge and for more than 150 years without the
prese nce o f any judge at all; (2 ) while this does not mean that any practice
in military courts which might have been accepted at some time in history
autom atically satisfies due pro cess, the historical fact that military judges
have never had tenure is a factor which must be we ighed; and (3 ) app licable
U CM J provisions and corresponding regulations, by insulating military
judges from the effects of command influence, sufficiently preserve judicial
impa rtiality ....
Id.

57

See 10 U.S.C. § 825(d)(2) (2000) (“When co nvening a court-martial, the
convening authority shall detail as members thereof such members of the armed
forces as, in his opinion, are best qua lified for the duty by reason of age, education,
training, experience, length of service, and ju dicial tem perament.”).
58
See United States v. Hilow, 32 M.J. 439, 44 0 (C.M.A. 1991) (prohibiting
stacking of the pool o f poten tial mem bers o f the cou rt-martial).
59
See James A. Y oung , Revising the Cou rt Memb er Selection Process, 163
MIL. L. REV. 91 (2000 ); Guy P. G lazier, He Called for His Pipe, and Called for
his Bowl, and He Called for his Members Three-Selection of Military Juries by the
Sovereign: Impediment to Military Justice, 157 M IL. L. REV. 1 (199 8); Hodso n,
supra note 25, at 53 .
60
In 1999, Congress directed the Secretary of Defense to submit a report on the
method of selection of membe rs of the A rmed Forc es to serve on courts-martial. See
National Defense Authoization Act for Fiscal Year 2000 § 552, Pub. L. No. 106-65,
113 Stat. 513 (O ct. 5, 1999 ). Congress required that the rep ort examine alternatives,
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A third, often repeated, criticism deals with the influence commanders
have over the military justice system. 61 Under current law, commanders*14
determine whether to convene a court-martial62 and what charges to refer.63
After trial, they also have the power to approve or disapprove guilty
verdicts and the power to remit punishments.64 In addition, although
commanders may not attempt to influence courts-martial,65 the reality
remains that the accused, the court-members, the witnesses, and the trial
counsel usually fall within their commands. Many commentators,
accordingly, believe that commanders should have less direct and indirect
control over military justice.66

including random selection, to the current system of selection of members by
courts-martial by the convening authority. Congress specified that any alternative
considered be consistent with member selection criteria of 10 U.S.C. § 25 (d)(2).
The JSC studied the issue and concluded that the current practice best applies the
criteria of Article 25(d), UCM J, consistent with demands of fairness and justice in
the military justice system. See REPORT OF THE D OD JOINT SERVICE
COM M IT T EE ON THE METHOD OF SELECTION OF MEMBERS OF THE
ARMED FORCES TO SERVE ON COURTS-MARTIAL, EXECUTIVE
SUMM ARY (August 1999) (on file at the Criminal Law Division of the Army
Office of The Judge Adv ocate Ge neral).
61
Colonel M ark H arvey, o f the OTJ AG -CLD , indicated the most frequent
criticism by the public of the military justice system relates to the unit com mander’s
discretionary decision to prefer charges and thereafter the general court-martial
convening authority’s decision to refer the charges to court-martial. Following trial,
there is frequent criticism of the findings and sentence, and performance of the
defense counsel. Complaints usually originate from the accused, victim or from
their family me mbe rs and friends. C riticism that the convening authority has too
many roles or too much power in the military justice system is extremely rare.
Colonel H arvey could recall less than ten com plaints that the co nvening authority
had too much authority under the UC MJ. Harvey Interview, supra note 20. See also
supra note 20 (describing the role of OT JAG , CLD in respond ing to questions from
the public).
62
See 10 U .S.C. § § 82 2-82 4 (power to convene cou rts-martial).
63
See id. § 83 4 (referral of ch arges).
64
See id. § 86 0 (actions of the con vening authority after trial).
65
See id. § 83 7 (prohib iting unlawful com mand influence).
66
See Spak & T ome s, supra note 5 6, at 512 (discussing the problems of the
commander’s strong influence ); Ho dson, supra note 25, at 45 (proposing a
requirement to limit prosecutorial discretion by requiring a judge advo cate to
review a com mander’s charges for legal sufficiency); Donald W . Hansen, Judicial
Functions for the Comm ander, 41 MIL. L. REV. 1, 40 (1968) (advocating a similar
proposal).
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If reformers want to address these kinds of criticisms, the question arises
whether changing the MCM rule-making process would help to achieve
them. Generalizations are difficult because critics may see different
solutions. I am doubtful, however, that reforming the rule-making process
would have much effect on efforts to address these kinds of criticisms for
three reasons.
First, the UCMJ limits the kinds of changes that the President may make
through amendments to the MCM. Although the President has the power to
promulgate rules of evidence and procedure, these rules may not contradict
anything in the UCMJ, such as the panel member selection criteria in
Article 25(d).67 As a result, no matter what the MCM rule-making process
looks like, the President generally cannot effect radical changes to the
military justice system. For example, the President could not amend the
MCM to take away the commander’s discretion to decide which kinds of
courts-martial to convene, which charges to refer to courts-martial, or
which service members are eligible to serve as members of particular
courts-martial.
*15 Second, even if the MCM rule-making process allowed more
external input, the President seems unlikely to use the process to make
major reforms of the military justice system. In the past, the President has
reformatted the rules of evidence and procedure, but has not changed the
overall operation of the system. Instead, the President has left that kind of
task to Congress. For example, as noted above, Congress created military
judges in the Military Justice Act of 1968;68 the President did not attempt
this dramatic reform of the military justice system through executive order.
Third, proposals for reforming the MCM rule-making process generally
involve adding more formalities. For instance, as noted above, Captain
Barry advocates creating new committees, imposing new publication
requirements, delaying the effective date of changes, and so forth.69
Experience from other fields suggests that adding formalities of these kinds

67

See 10 U .S.C. § 836 (authorizin g the President to promulgate rules of
evidence and p rocedures “which may no t be co ntrary to or inco nsistent with” the
UCM J). See also supra note 61 (discussing the Report of the DOD Joint Service
Committee on the Method of Selection of Members of the Armed Forc es to Serve
on C ourts-M artial).
68
See supra note 3 9.
69
See supra Part 1.
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generally impedes rule-making efforts.70 Indeed, the more significant and
the more controversial a desired amendment, the more likely someone will
use a formal procedure to block it.
In sum, changes to the process of amending the MCM, no matter how
reasonable, will not trigger radical change or facilitate any large-scale
reforms of the military justice system. Rather, as noted in the previous
discussion, they mostly will affect the manner in which the President makes
adjustments to the rules of evidence and procedure, either to correct errors
and oversights, or to implement incremental legislative changes, or to
conform the MCM to developments in the civilian courts.
C. Separation of Powers Concerns
The structure of the military justice system reflects a balance of power
between Congress and the President. At present, Congress controls the
content of the UCMJ, while the President has authority over the MCM.71
Imposing new restrictions or procedures on the rule-making process may
*16 dilute the President’s power. Accordingly, any change to the MCM
rule-making process necessarily affects the overall balance of power.
Balances of power may shift from time to time within the boundaries
established by the Constitution. Yet, caution dictates careful thought before
weakening one political branch. In many instances, tampering with long
established balances of powers may have far-reaching effects and
unintended consequences. As one example, reducing the President’s power
over the MCM might cause him or his political subordinates to adjust the
manner in which they exercise their discretion in dealing with military
justice issues. For instance, as noted below, the President may use greater
political scrutiny when appointing judges to the Court of Appeals for the
Armed Forces.
One response to the observation that the military justice system reflects
a balance of power might be that the President derives his power to
promulgate MCM provisions through UCMJ Article 36.72 If Congress
desired, it could eliminate this delegation. Using its power to “To make

70

See To dd D . Rakoff, The Choice Between Formal and Informal Modes of
Administrative Regulation, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 159, 162-65 (2000) (noting how
movements to less formal rule-making increase the numb er of rules made by
adm inistrative agencies).
71
See 10 U.S.C. § 83 6 (granting the President power to pro mulga te the rules in
the MCM , so long as they d o not conflict with the U CM J).
72
See id.
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Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval forces,”73
Congress could establish its own rules of evidence and procedure by
statute. Accordingly, the argument would be that the balance of power has
no great constitutional significance.
This reasoning, although not necessarily incorrect, fails to take into
account the special role of the President in our system of government.
Article II, section 2 makes the President the Commander in Chief.74 In
United States v. Swaim,75 the Supreme Court held that this status gives the
President at least some authority over courts-martial, even in the absence
of legislation from Congress.76 The precise implications of this holding
*17 remain unclear, but some commentators have concluded that the
President could have promulgated the rules in the MCM even without the
grant of authority from Article 36.77 The Court of Military Appeals,
moreover, has upheld an MCM provision in at least one instance based
solely on the President’s constitutional authority and not any statutory grant
of power.78
Another response to worries about separation of powers might be that
the President in reality exercises little power over the MCM. In most

73

U.S. CO NS T. art. 1, § 8, cl. 14.
See id. art. 2, § 2 , cl. 1.
75
165 U.S. 553 (1897).
76
See id. at 558 (holding that “it is within the power of the president of the
United S tates, as commander in chief, to validly co nvene a gen eral co urt-martial”
even without expre ss statutory authorization).
77
See W illiam F. Fratcher, Presidential Power to Reg ulate Military Justice: A
Critical Study of Decisions of the Cou rt of Military Appea ls, 34 N.Y.U.L. REV.
861, 862-63 (19 59) (“Unless restricted by express statute, the President has power,
under the Constitution, to issue regulations defining offenses within the armed
forces, prescribing punishments for them, constituting tribunals to try such offenses,
and fixing the mode of procedure and methods of review of proceedings of such
tribunals.”). See also CLINTON ROSSITER, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
COMMANDER IN CHIEF 109 (1951) (reaching similar conclusions about the
President’s inherent power to regulate d iscipline in the armed forces); EDWARD
S. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT, OFFICE AND POW ERS 316 (3d ed. 1948)
(same). But see Ziegel W . Neff, Presidential Power to Reg ulate Military Justice,
30 JUDGE AD VOCAT E J. 6, 6-11 (1960) (arguing that the Constitution does not
grant the President plenary power over military justice).
78
See United States v. Ezell, 6 M.J. 307, 316-18 (C.M .A. 1979) (upholding a
provision in the 1969 MCM allowing commanding officers to issue search warran ts,
even though the UCMJ at that time did not authorize the President to create rules
gove rning pretrial activities).
74
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instances, the JSC prepares the changes and the President simply signs an
executive order putting them into effect. As a result, the President and his
political subordinates probably would have little objection to changing the
rule-making process, even if the changes theoretically weakened executive
power.
This response has much truth in it. Still, in a few instances, the President
or political members of the DOD may want specific amendments to deal
with politically charged topics. The list of aggravating factors such as
capital offenses (of which at least one must be found for a sentence of
death), may provide one example.79 A President with strong views on
capital punishment may wish to retain plenary power to alter the list. If
restrictions on the MCM rule-making process inhibit the President, then the
President might react by using other powers to influence the military justice
system.
III. Assessment of Captain Barry’s Seven Proposals
Captain Barry’s proposals appear modest and reasonable at first glance.
The recommendations generally strive to make more information available,
to expand the number of persons who can participate in the MCM revision
process, and to establish additional stages of review. The *18 support for
most of the suggestions, from the ABA House of Delegates and from Major
General Hodson, gives them weight.
Yet, upon closer inspection, the benefits from adding new procedures
and formalities to the MCM amendment process turn out to be largely
illusory. The proposals at best would offer only marginal improvements to
the present procedure, while imposing additional burdens-sometimes
substantial burdens-on the system. For these reasons, Congress, the
President, and the DOD should hesitate to adopt them without more
evidence that the benefits of change will outweigh the costs.
A. The ABA’s Advisory Committee Proposal
In 1997, as noted above, the ABA House of Delegates by formal
resolution recommended creating “a broadly constituted advisory committee, including public membership and including representatives of the bar,
the judiciary, and legal scholars, to consider and recommend rules of
procedure and evidence at courts-martial.” 80 The report accompanying this

79

See MCM , supra note 3, R.C .M. 10 04(c) (listing aggravating factors, at least
of one of which is necessary for a sentence o f death).
80
AB A Summary, supra note 2 4, at 2.
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recommendation explains that members of the bar would include military
trial and defense counsel as well as civilian practitioners.81
Captain Barry and the report accompanying the ABA proposal provide
little substantive argument for this recommendation. On the contrary, they
justify the recommendation solely by pointing out that the Federal Judicial
Conference has the benefit of a similar advisory committee to assist it in
devising rules of evidence and procedure for the federal courts.82 They
would like to see the same kind of assistance in the military context.
*19 This proposal is neither radical nor dangerous. Its implementation
would not require dramatic effort. The JSC, or a similar body, could
compile a list of names of potential advisors who would agree to serve on
an advisory committee without pay. This advisory committee from time to
time could offer suggestions for changes to rules of evidence and procedure
in the MCM.
Why then has the DOD declined to establish an advisory committee?
One reason may be that little need exists for such a committee. Members
of the bench and bar, academics, and others already have the ability to
recommend changes directly to the JSC. They do not have to act through
an advisory committee, although they certainly could create their own
private committees if they desired. Indeed, as Captain Barry indicates,
SCAFL has periodically made recommendations to the JSC that were
carefully considered by the JSC.
Department of Defense Directive 5500.17 requires the JSC to conduct
an annual review of the MCM, with an eye to finding needed
amendments.83 The same directive explicitly provides: “It is DOD policy
to encourage public participation in the JSC’s review of [the MCM].”84

81

STANDING COMMITTEE ON ARMED FORCES LAW ET AL., REPORT
TO THE H OUSE O F DELEGAT ES 5 (1997) (“First, the Committee recommends
a statute be enacted by Congress establishing a bro adly constituted advisory
committee, including public membership, to make recomm endations concerning
presidential rulemaking affecting courts-martial and app eals, similar to committees
presc ribed for other Federal courts.” ).
82
See id. at 3, 11 . Federal law provides: “The Jud icial Conference may
authorize the appointment of committees to assist the Conference by recommend ing
rules to be prescribed ... under this title. Each such committee shall consist of
members of the bench and the professional bar, and trial and appellate judges.” 28
U.S.C. § 2073 (a)(2) (2000).
83
DO D D IRE CT IVE NO . 550 0.17 , supra note 1 0, § E 2.1.
84
Id. § E3.4.2 .
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The JSC has implemented these requirements.85 As a result, any member
of the public or Armed Forces may communicate suggestions to the JSC for
changing rules of procedure or evidence.
Members of the JSC’s working group, indeed, long have urged soldiers
and civilians to participate in the amendment process. In 1992, working
group member Major Eugene Milhizer published an article explaining the
process in The Army Lawyer. At the end of the article he proclaimed:
Amending the Manual should be a cooperative process that incorporates
input and ideas from a variety of interested sources. All persons concerned
with the quality of the military justice system are encouraged to submit to
the JSC their suggestions for amending the Manual.86 *20 After giving the
mailing address for sending comments, Major Milhizer concluded: “Take
the time to help improve military justice. It certainly is worth the effort.”87
For the past seven years, the JSC has used similar notices published in the
Federal Register to solicit comments and suggestions.88
Starting in 2000, moreover, the JSC service representatives have begun
sending annual calls for proposals to the judiciary, trial, and defense
organizations, and judge advocate general schools.89 The JSC will
acknowledge all proposals received from individuals or organizations
outside DOD, discuss the proposal, and notify the sender in writing whether
the JSC voted to decline the proposal as not within the JSC’s cognizance,
reject it, table it, or accept it.90 Although these organizations previously
have had the opportunity to make suggestions, these new procedures may
provide them greater encouragement.

85

See J OIN T SE RV ICE C OM M ITTEE OF MILITARY JUSTICE, INTERNAL
ORGANIZATION AND OPERATING PROCEDURES OF THE JOINT
SERVICE COM MITT EE ON M ILITARY JUSTICE pt. III (March 2000)
[hereinafter JS C O PE RATING PR OC ED UR ES].
86
Eugene M ilhizer, Amending the Manual for Courts-Martial, ARMY LAW .,
Apr. 199 2, at 81 .
87
Id.
88
See, e.g., 58 F ed. R eg. 19,40 9, 19,410 (1993) (soliciting comments on
proposed changes to the MCM ).
89
Each JSC service representative evaluates proposals received within the
service and sponsors proposals, as appropriate to the JSC for consideration in the
next annua l review cycle. See JSC OPERATING PR OC ED UR ES, supra note 86,
pt. III.
90
See id.
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The process of implementing the new psychotherapist-patient privilege
into Military Rule of Evidence 513 provides an excellent example of public
participation under the current system of military rule-making and the
impact it may have. The initial draft of Military Rule of Evidence 513
developed by the JSC and published in the Federal Register did not include
“clinical social worker” within the definition of “psychotherapist.” This
draft received a large volume of oral and written public comment, including
suggestions from the American Psychiatric Association, and the American
Psychology Association. At the public hearing, the JSC heard persuasive
testimony about the extensive and important role of clinical social workers
in psychotherapy. As a result of this informed public comment from experts
in the field, the JSC modified the definition of “psychotherapist” to include
“clinical social workers.”91
*21 Captain Barry himself briefly alludes to another reason that JSC has
not sought to create an advisory committee. In particular, the proposed
advisory committee almost certainly would come within the coverage of the
Federal Advisory Committee Act.92 This Act imposes nontrivial record
keeping and other requirements on advisory committees.93 It also expressly
discourages the creation of unnecessary committees.94
Although the JSC undoubtedly could insure compliance with the Act,
the effort does not seem worthwhile. As noted previously, interested
members of the bench and bar already have ample means to advance
proposals for changing the MCM. Creating an advisory committee,
ironically, probably would not make more input possible. On the contrary,
it might reduce the input because federal advisory committee members may
fall within the scope of federal conflict of interest laws.95 As a result,
defense attorneys who serve on the committee might not be able to

91

Exec. Order N o. 13 ,140 ,64 F ed. R eg. 19 6, § 2 (a)(O ct. 12, 199 9).
5 U.S.C. app. 2 §§ 1 -12.
93
See id. § 10 (requiring meetings open to the public, detailed minutes, and
pub lic inspection o f documents).
94
See id. § 2(b)(1) (“[N]ew adviso ry com mittees should be established only
when they are determined to be essential and their number should be kept to the
minimum ne cessary.”).
95
See Michelle N uszkiewicz, N ote, Twenty Years of the Federal Advisory
Comm ittee Act: Its Time for Some Changes, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 957, 961 (1992)
(arguing that 18 U.S.C. § 2 08 b ars ad visory comm ittees from particip ating in
matters in which they or their firms have a financial interest). The Federal Advisory
Committee Act itself mandates that advisory com mittees not “be inapp ropriately
influenced ... by any special interest.” 5 U .S.C. app. 2 § 5(b )(2).
92
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participate in decisions that would benefit their clients. This sacrifice seems
too great; some of the most likely advisory committee members-like
Captain Barry-have active legal practices with many clients.
Finally, Captain Barry notes that changes to the MCM are political.96
Although he is quite correct, creating an advisory committee would not
ensure more democratic results than those achieved under the present
system. Members of advisory committees are no more politically accountable than the JSC. If the problem is that certain proposals to change the
military justice system are likely to raise substantial political controversy,
then Congress or the President ought to play the lead role in making them.
Unlike advisory committees, they are subject to democratic pressures.
*22 B. The ABA’s Rule-making Procedure Proposal
The ABA, as noted above, also wants to see “a method of adopting rules
of procedure and evidence at courts-martial which is generally consistent
with court rule-making procedure in Federal civilian courts.” 97 Evaluating
this proposal first requires an understanding of the rule-making procedure
in the federal civilian courts. It then calls for an assessment of the benefits
and costs that the proposal would produce.
1. Overview of Federal Civilian Rule-Making Procedure
Various authors have described the rule-making procedure in the federal
civilian courts.98 By statute, Congress has given the Supreme Court the
power to “prescribe general rules of practice and procedure for the federal
courts.”99 These rules include the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedures
and Federal Rules of Evidence, which govern federal civilian criminal
proceedings and serve the same purpose as the Rules for Courts-Martial
and the Military Rules of Evidence.
The Supreme Court does not draft procedural and evidentiary rules
itself. Instead, the Court relies on the recommendations of a body called the

96

See Barry, supra note 2, at 246 (quoting 1 FRANCIS A. GILLIGAN &
FRED RIC I. LEDERER, COURT-MARTIAL PROCEDUR E P 1-54.00, at 30
n.148 (2d ed. 199 9)).
97
AB A Summary, supra note 2 4, at 2.
98
See, e.g., Rob ert G. Bone, The Process of Making Process: Cou rt Rulemaking, Demo cratic Legitimacy, and Procedural Efficacy, 87 GEO. L.J. 887 (199 9);
Thomas E. B aker, An Introduction to Federal Cou rt Rule Making, 22 TEX. TECH.
L. REV. 323 , 324 (1991); David L. Shapiro, Federal Rule 16: A Look at the Theo ry
and Practice of Rulemaking, 137 U. P A. L. R EV . 196 9 (1989 ).
99
28 U .S.C. § 207 2(a) (2000).
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“Judicial Conference of the United States.”100 The Chief Justice of the
United States chairs the Judicial Conference.101 Its other members include
the chief judges of the United States Courts of Appeals, twelve district
court judges, and the Chief Judge of the Court of International Trade.102
The Judicial Conference relies heavily on an important committee
known as the “Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure.”103
The Judicial Conference also receives assistance from various advisory
committees, including an Advisory Committee on Criminal *23 Rules.104
The membership of the advisory committees includes state and federal
judges, practicing lawyers, and law professors.105 The Chief Justice
appoints the members of all the committees.106
Each advisory committee has a continuing obligation to study the rules
within its field.107 It may consider suggestions for revisions from any
source, and may generate its own proposals.108 Proposals approved by the
advisory committee undergo review first by the Standing Committee.109 If
the Standing Committee approves them, the Judicial Conference reviews
them next.110 The Judicial Conference then may forward them to the
Supreme Court.111
The Supreme Court generally approves the recommendations of the
Judicial Conference. It then must forward the proposals to Congress during
a regular session, but prior to the start of May.112 To give Congress the
opportunity for review, the rules do not become effective until
December.113 During the interim, Congress may pass legislation disapprov-

100

See Baker, supra note 9 9, at 32 8.
See id.
102
See id.
103
Id. at 329.
104
See id.
105
See id.
106
See id.
107
See 28 U .S.C. § 207 3(b) (2000).
108
See Baker, supra note 9 9, at 32 9.
109
See id.
110
See id.
111
See id.
112
See 28 U .S.C. § 207 4(a).
113
See id.
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ing them. 114 Congress also can bypass the Federal Civilian Rule-making
procedure in whole or in part.115
*24 2. Benefits of Adopting the Civilian Rule-Making Process
Neither Captain Barry nor the ABA explain fully how they envision the
civilian rule-making procedures working in the military context. One likely
possibility would involve a military judicial conference composed of
military judges and headed by the JSC. The military judicial conference
would make proposals after receiving recommendations from advisory
committees. The President would promulgate changes to the MCM only
after the advisory committees, the military judicial conference, and the JSC
all had approved them.
This approach probably would not require new legislation. The
President has the power to create advisory committees and could direct
military judges to serve as part of a judicial conference. (By contrast, as
discussed below, Major General Hodson’s proposal to involve members of
the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces would require action by
Congress.) The President could further exercise discretion not to issue
amendments unless they had obtained full approval.
The more important issue is whether a new rule-making process of this
sort would provide any substantial benefit. Captain Barry and the ABA,
unfortunately, do not explain in any detail how their proposal would
improve the current rule-making process. On the contrary, as mentioned
previously, the ABA’s report for the most part simply notes that the federal
courts use a different system. Presumably, they believe that the formal
114

See id.
For example, Congress wen t against the recommend ations of the Advisory
Committee when it adopted Federal Rules of Evidence 413, 414, and 41 5. Congress
origina lly bypassed the normal rule-making process and passed these three
evidentiary rules sub ject to reconsideration upon objection by the Judicial
Conference. The Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules met and considered
eighty-four written comments, overwhelmingly opposing the new rules. The Judicial
Conference objected and proposed, in the alternative, that Federal Rules of
Evidence 404 and 405 be amended to correct ambiguities and constitutional
infirmities in Fed eral Rules of E vidence 41 3, 41 4, and 415 . At the tim e, the
Standing Comm ittees were composed of over forty judges, practicing lawyers, and
academics. Everyone, except the Department of Justice, opposed proposed Federal
Rules of Evidence 413, 41 4, and 415. In spite of overwhelming opp osition by
federal rule makers, Congress declined to reconsider its original passage of Federal
Rules of Evidenc e 413, 41 4, and 415 and these rules became law in 19 95. See FED.
C RIM . CODE & RULES 256-58 (2000); SAL TZ BU RG , supra note 41, at 673-74.
115
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participation of large numbers of experienced personnel, and the multiple
stages of review, would provide better proposals for changes to the MCM.
Their view that a judicial conference would enhance the process might
prove true, if tested, but I see substantial reason for some skepticism. In
particular, Captain Barry and the ABA fail to note that a wide range of
commentators recently have criticized the federal civilian court rule-making
process. Although no one has called for scrapping the process altogether,
their valid objections do raise doubts about the benefits of importing
similar formalities into the MCM amendment process.
Professor Thomas Baker, who has served on an advisory committee for
civil procedure, has advanced perhaps the leading criticism of the civilian
court rule-making process. He has observed that most of the participants in
the process make their decisions based simply on anecdotal evidence and
subjective normative judgments.116 Although the judges, practitioners, and
academics who serve on the various committees have *25 extensive
practical experience, they generally have no empirical or scientific basis for
assessing the merits of proposed amendments.117 Other observers also have
advanced this criticism.118
The JSC, at present, undeniably has the same problem when it evaluates
proposals for changing the MCM. It often must make determinations based
on informed intuition rather than on any kind of objective data. But
involving more experts in the process will not necessarily make this
problem go away. Advisory panels and multiple layers of review will add
more opinions, but they may not provide any better information than the
JSC already can obtain through its study of the military justice system and
by receiving public comment.119
Another problem with the civilian rule-making process is that it invites
the meddling of special interest groups. Professor Linda S. Mullenix, who
like Professor Baker also has served on the civil procedure advisory
committee, has documented how the process has become increasingly
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politicized.120 Because procedural rules often will affect some persons
more than others, the most concerned individuals inevitably have a strong
desire to seek favorable treatment, regardless of the consequences to others.
Various other scholars have made similar observations.121
*26 Professor Mullenix laments that advisory committees really have no
good option for addressing this form of politicization. She states:
The Advisory Committee’s dilemma, then, is this: On the one hand, it
can ... shunt all potentially controversial rule reforms to Congress. If this
happens, the Advisory Committee will become an ineffective third branch
institution. On the other hand, the Advisory Committee can embrace the
new openness, [and] meet interest group demands ....122 T h e s e c o n d
choice, obviously, does not help the system because it produces results that
favor the most vocal advocates over all others, regardless of the merits of
their positions. This problem is particular troubling when the results
concern maintenance of good order and discipline in the military, because
this important objective often has no particular spokesperson. 123
True, under current procedures, special interest groups already might
attempt to influence the JSC. Defense counsel, for example, can submit
comments and proposals to the JSC advocating positions that specifically
would aid their clients.124 They also can participate at public meetings.
They further can write law review articles or newspaper editorials.
This type of input by special interests, however, differs in an important
respect from the kind that Professor Mullenix discusses. Under current
rules, private parties have no formal role in the amendment procedure.
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They can make suggestions, but they cannot vote on proposals. The JSC
thus does not have to confront the dilemma described by Professor
Mullenix.
In addition, to a large extent, the civilian rule-making process serves a
different function from the current MCM rule-making procedures. When
the federal courts amend their rules, they usually are breaking new ground.
They are creating novel evidentiary standards or they are implementing
procedural innovations. These kinds of changes in theory might benefit *27
from the prolonged deliberation that the civilian rule-making procedures
foster.
The JSC does important work, but realistically it plays a less innovative
role than the Judicial Conference. The JSC usually follows changes that
already have occurred in civilian rules of evidence and procedure. The
1999 amendments to the MCM provide a good example.125 In those
amendments, as discussed above, the President created a psychotherapist-patient evidentiary privilege and also certain special rules for child
witnesses in sexual abuse cases.126 These amendments, while significant,
did not require the JSC to engage in original thinking. The federal civilian
courts have recognized a psychotherapist-patient evidentiary privilege since
1996,127 and state courts have had special procedures for child testimony
for many years. 128 Thus, the public commentary and other complicated
procedures used by the federal courts for rule-making infiltrate through the
JSC into the MCM.
Finally, the civilian rule-making procedure tends to take a long time. 129
The process, as described above, involves multiple layers of approval and
review. In many instances, minor, uncontroversial, but important changes
may take several years to go into effect. By contrast, the JSC annual review
system results in a systemic review of the MCM within each year. Indeed,
125

See Exec. Order N o. 13 , 140 , 64 F ed. R eg. 55 ,115 (Oct. 6, 1999).
See id.
127
See Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 16-1 8 (1996 ) (hold ing that Federal Rule
of Evidence 501 requires federal courts to recognize a psychotherapist-patient
privilege).
128
See John G. D ouglass, Beyond Admissibility: Real Confrontation, Virtual
Confrontation, and the Right to Confront Hearsay, 67 GEO. WA SH. L. REV.. 191,
214 -15 (1 999 ) (discussing this trend and the constitutional implications).
129
See Mark O wens K asanin, Amending Ru le 9(h): An Exa mp le of How the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Get Changed, 27 J. MAR. L. & COM. 417
(1996) (providing an interesting narrative account o f a mino r amendm ent to a rule
affecting admiralty cases).
126

CAUTIOUS SKEPTICISM ABOUT FORMALITIES

28

its annual review contemplates that it generally will solve all problems that
arise.
The civilian rule-making process has produced a workable and not
overly controversial set of rules for the federal courts. The MCM rule-making procedure, however, has achieved the same result for military courts.
In deciding whether the military should adopt the civilian process, the
question boils down to whether the benefits outweigh the burdens. In view
of the difficulty of stating the benefits of replicating the civilian process,*28 and the apparent problems replicating it would introduce, a
convincing case has not been made.
C. The ABA’s Congressional Oversight Proposal
In addition to its two other recommendations, the ABA also has asked
for “requirements for reporting to Congress [and] a waiting period for rules
of procedure and evidence at courts-martial.”130 The federal civilian court
rule-making procedure, as noted above, incorporates these features.131 It
requires the Supreme Court to transmit proposed changes to Congress and
affords Congress at least seven months to intervene before new rules go
into effect.
The pertinent statute governing federal civilian court rule-making says:
The Supreme Court shall transmit to the Congress not later than May 1
of the year in which a rule prescribed under section 2072 is to become
effective a copy of the proposed rule. Such a rule shall take effect no earlier
than December 1 of the Year in which such rule is so transmitted unless
otherwise provided by law.132 Two points about this provision require
specific mention. First, the statute does not require Congress to take any
action. If Congress does nothing, the new rules become effective. Second,
to block proposed changes, Congress must pass an actual law. Both houses
must approve a bill and present it to the President for signature or veto.
Imposing a similar waiting period for amendments to the MCM
rule-making procedures would not work a fundamental change in the JSC’s
current procedures. At present, as noted above, the JSC waits seventy-five
days after announcing changes to the MCM before transmitting them to the
President.133 Without great difficulty, the JSC could extend the delay to
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*29 seven months to give Congress the same amount of time that it has to
review changes in the civilian rules.
Still, I doubt that Congress actually would take advantage of an
extended period of delay to block proposed MCM changes. In general,
Congress has deferred to the military in determining the procedural and
evidentiary needs of military justice system. To my knowledge, it has never
attempted to overrule any MCM provisions by statute. Indeed, it often has
amended the UCMJ to comport with the DOD on policy recommendations.
Thus, the proposal would do little more than prolong the MCM rule-making
process.
In addition, recent experience from federal civilian court rule-making
procedure suggests that a required delay before rules become effective may
give more power to special interest groups who want to defeat proposed
changes. For example, several years ago, the Supreme Court transmitted to
Congress a new civil procedure rule requiring litigants to make certain
disclosures in discovery.134 Lobbyists nearly killed the measure in
Congress.135
D. General Hodson’s Military Judicial Conference Proposal
More than twenty-five years ago, Major General Hodson urged that “a
Military Judicial Conference, headed by the Chief Judge of the Court of
Military Appeals [now the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces], be
established and given power to prescribe rules of procedure and
evidence.”136 This proposal for altering the MCM rule-making procedure
resembles the ABA’s second recommendation, but with a major difference.
It would take authority away from the JSC and President, and vest it in the
civilian judges on the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces.
The previous discussion has highlighted some of the reasons to doubt
that the judicial conference model of rule-making greatly would improve
the present work of the JSC. Major General Hodson’s proposal, though,
*30 would have a further potentially harmful effect. In particular, it would
tend to upset the balance of power between Congress and the President.
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To put Major General Hosdon’s proposal into effect, Congress would
have to amend UCMJ Article 36. 137 The amendment would have to say that
the President could not alter the rules of evidence and procedure except
upon the Court of Appeals for the Armed Force’s recommendation.
Otherwise, the President simply could ignore the Court of Appeals for the
Armed Forces in the rule-making process.138
This amendment to Article 36 would raise possible constitutional
questions. The UCMJ prevents the President from discharging members of
Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces for any reason other than neglect
of duty, misconduct, or mental or physical disability. 139 In general,
Congress may not impose restrictions on the President’s ability to discharge
individuals who exercise executive functions, if the restrictions would
“unduly trammel on executive authority.”140
The President would have a substantial argument that deciding the kinds
of rules that courts-martial should have is an executive function. The
President has created rules for courts-martial for half a century under the
UCMJ and did the same earlier under the Articles of War. Indeed, the
President even has established rules in the absence of legislation under his
powers as Commander-in-Chief.141 Because a duty to act only with the
Court of Appeals for the Armed Force’s approval would trammel on this
important function, the only question is whether the effect is excessive.
In any case, even if the provision would not violate the Constitution, it
would alter the current balance of power between Congress and the
President. The measure clearly would weaken the President’s role in the
process. Congress would retain complete control over the content of the
*31 UCMJ, while the President would lose the power to change the MCM
without approval from others.
The President might overlook this shift in power. Just as easily,
however, the proposal might have far reaching consequences. For example,
the President’s selection of judges for the Court of Appeals for the Armed
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Forces might become more political. Similarly, the President might put
greater pressure on the service secretaries to oversee criminal justice issues.
Again, the question is whether the potential benefit outweighs the possible
cost.
E. Captain Barry’s Public Availability Proposal
Captain Barry, as noted above, does not merely advocate adopting the
proposals of the ABA and of Major General Hodson. On the contrary, he
also advances three significant additional recommendations of his own. He
first urges creating an enforceable “mechanism to make available to the
public the contents [of] and justifications for ... proposals ... generated
within DOD.”142 Captain Barry states: “An open process that would allow
for access not only to all proposals-but to their justifications and explanations as well-would clearly be a huge improvement.”143
This recommendation requires some background information to
evaluate. At present, although anyone may suggest MCM changes to the
JSC, traditionally most proposals do not come from the general public.
Instead, they originate from within the DOD. Either service members make
them, or they come down from the DOD leadership.
The origin within the DOD of the majority of proposals should not come
as a surprise. Judge advocates have the most involvement in the military
justice system. They also tend to understand the proper channels through
which to make recommendations for amending the MCM. Despite the
newly instituted annual call to the public for suggestions, judge advocates
probably will continue to have a dominant role in the process.
Although Captain Barry does not state this point explicitly, he may be
assuming-and, if so, correctly-that the DOD could implement a requirement
that any DOD personnel who make recommendations provide written*32
justifications for them. The DOD then could require the JSC to publish
these proposals and their justifications in the Federal Register. The JSC
then would have to disclose and explain any action taken on the proposals.
This recommendation, like all of Captain Barry’s suggestions, appears
reasonable enough. The JSC could follow his suggestion without having to
give up any aspect of its current practices. Again, the only question is
whether the benefit justifies the burden.
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The public might benefit from disclosure of the JSC’s reasons for
rejecting proposals. Civilian defense counsel, for instance, may wish to
criticize what they consider insufficient reasons for rejecting proposals that
might benefit their clients. In addition, a public record of what the JSC has
and has not considered would assist anyone thinking about submitting
future changes.
The burden of the proposal, in some ways, does not seem very great.
Most DOD personnel who make proposals already are providing written
justifications for their adoption. When the JSC decides to make changes,
moreover, it usually writes an analysis or discussion section explaining
their purpose and effect. Accordingly, Captain Barry’s proposal would
impose a significant new burden only in requiring to the JSC to explain its
reasons for declining to adopt proposals generated within the DOD.
The JSC, however, has understandable reasons for wishing to avoid the
process of justifying its decisions not to adopt proposals. Unless they are
superficial and unhelpful (for example, “The proposed changes are
unwarranted.”), providing explanations may take a great deal of work. If the
JSC rejected a large number of proposals, it might have to increase the
number of personnel assigned to its working group or ask the current
members to neglect their other duties so that they could write reasons for
rejecting the proposals. Efficiency of operation is of particular concern as
the military services have been downsized.
Experience in other areas also indicates that the task of providing
written justifications in formal rule-making procedures can become
increasingly burdensome. The Administrative Procedure Act, for example,
requires agencies to provide a “concise general statement” of its rationale
for rules.144 Many agencies have found that if they provide only a short
statement, they open themselves up to criticism. Accordingly, they try to
provide as comprehensive justifications as possible. Professor Todd *33
Rakoff has observed: “Statements of Justification that used to be a few
paragraphs
or pages now run to tens of pages, each three columns wide.”
145
From the JSC’s perspective, moreover, providing reasons for each
action not taken might cause unnecessary and harmful embarrassment. For
example, suppose a judge on the Army Court of Criminal Appeals
recommends changes to the MCM and the JSC decides not to implement
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them. The JSC certainly would not relish the task of calling public attention
to what it considers the flaws in the judge’s ideas. Fear of public criticism,
moreover, might dissuade others from recommending changes.
In sum, the issue has two sides, and no clear answer. Here, the stakes do
not seem very large. Although the JSC probably should decline to act, it
could attempt to follow Captain Barry’s suggestion on a trial basis. If the
burden proves excessive, then it could rethink the issue.
F. Captain Barry’s Minutes Proposal
Captain Barry also has recommended that the JSC make available to the
public the minutes of its meetings and the minutes of its working group. 146
I have seen the minutes of a few meetings, and they generally contain only
minimal information about its decisions. Because the JSC and its working
group diligently keep these records, the proposal would impose little or no
burden on them. The JSC, indeed, already publishes the analysis to
proposed changes in the Federal Register.
On the other hand, confidentiality often serves important purposes. For
example, Congress exempted deliberative process material from disclosure
under the Freedom of Information Act for three policy reasons: first, to
encourage, open, frank discussions on matters of policy between subordinates and superiors; second to protect against premature disclosure of
proposed policies before they are finally adopted; and third, to protect
against public confusion that might result from disclosure of reasons and
rationales that were not in fact ultimately the grounds for agency action.147
*34 Releasing the JSC minutes potentially could harm all of these interests
and particularly the third.
G. Captain Barry’s JSC Proposal
Captain Barry finally complains that the JSC’s membership at present
does not extend beyond the “five officers chiefly responsible for the
administration of military justice in the five services.” Although he does
not spell out exactly whom he would like to see included, he does note that
the ABA’s Standing Committee on Armed Forces Law previously has
urged the expansion of the JSC to “include public members.”148
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This proposal raises some of the same considerations as the earlier
proposal to create a broadly-constituted advisory board.149 To the extent
that the additional members would serve only to provide advice and make
proposals, questions of need again arise. Given that any member of the
public already can suggest changes to the MCM, adding more members to
the JSC solely for that purpose would not accomplish much.
The new members, however, probably would want to do more than just
make suggestions. They also would want to vote for or against proposals
for changing the MCM. Voting power would raise questions about how the
JSC could avoid the distorting effects of special interests. The Federal
Advisory Committee Act and conflict of interest rules also may pose
problems.
At present, some bias may exist within the JSC, but its extent should not
be exaggerated. As Captain Barry rightly notes, the five members of the
JSC have primary responsibility for administration of military justice in
their services. This responsibility does not mean that they represent only
the interest of the prosecutors. On the contrary, they represent the needs of
the entire system. In fact, JSC members normally have had experience
either as defense counsel or trial judges, or both.
Sometimes the JSC takes positions that favor the government. At other
times, however, the JSC approves measures favorable to the accused. For
example, as noted earlier, last year the JSC approved new MCM provisions
creating a psychotherapist-patient evidentiary privilege.150 This *35
provision aids the accused, who may have made incriminating statements
to psychiatrists or social workers. Another example of an amendment that
favors the accused is the 1998 amendment to Rule for Court-Martial 916(j)
that provides a mistake of fact defense to a prosecution for carnal knowledge when the accused believed that the victim was at least sixteen years
old at the time of the sexual intercourse.151
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By contrast, if members of the public were to serve on the JSC, they
might have difficulty subordinating any professional interests that may
differ from the general needs of the military justice system. Defense
counsel, for instance, naturally and justifiably would seek rules that tend to
aid their clients, while voting against amendments favorable to the
prosecution. This type of bias could have a distorting effect on the MCM.
Perhaps to some extent, the JSC could cancel out potential bias by
including members with opposing interests. For example, although logistics
might prove difficult, the JSC conceivably could include trial counsel or
commanders to weigh against the views of defense counsel. In the end,
however, the question remains whether it makes sense to disturb the JSC’s
formally neutral composition. I am skeptical of the need in view of the
JSC’s own experience and its willingness to obtain outside views.
V. Conclusion
The JSC has made significant progress in opening up the process of
amending the MCM. Much of credit for this development must go to
SCAFL and other organizations in which Captain Barry has served with
distinction. Although Captain Barry modestly declines to identify his
personal contribution, he undoubtedly played a key role, and deserves
ample credit.
The question now arises whether the JSC or DOD might take further
steps to change the MCM rule-making process. Captain Barry believes *36
that they can and should, and his views deserve careful consideration.
Nonetheless, the case for the changes that he requests is difficult to make.
The seven proposals discussed in Captain Barry’s article would add
more formalities to the MCM amendment process. The JSC would have to
seek input or perhaps even approval from advisory committees. It would
have to adhere to new waiting periods and publication requirements. It also
might have to explain more publicly its reasons for certain actions or
inactions.
The JSC and DOD in short order could implement most of these
formalities. The changes, however, probably would not do much good.
They would not bring fundamental reforms to the MCM. Indeed, they might
not change much of anything. At worst, they would risk upsetting the
present balance of power that has evolved between Congress and the
President.
For these reasons, this response has recommended hesitation in
embracing the seven proposals that Captain Barry has recommended.
Perhaps the JSC will want to experiment with some of them, such as
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making more records available to the public or maybe giving reasons for
rejecting proposed amendments to the MCM. Before doing so, however, it
also must consider what else it has on its list of priorities for improving the
military justice system.

